The debate over whether democratic nations will decline while more autocratic nations will rise over time, and why, often lacks empirical evidence. The Ukraine-Russia War might provide some sobering evidence.

The most obvious has been the inability of the US and several other allies of Ukraine to be capable of sustaining their levels of support. Consensus in democracies has long been difficult to achieve, but in good times, the failure of consensus has a conservative influence – doing nothing, and little harm is done. However, in bad times, with the present context of the Ukraine-Russia War, it is harmful. The US Congress is unable to make a positive decision to send renewed funding for military equipment and ammunition to Ukraine and thereby effecting life and death in Ukraine. In a wartime context, democracies might be more disadvantaged by their failures to act.  

A less obvious problem is tied to the degree liberal democracies tend to have more liberal market economies. In the short-term, business and industries can give support to an ally, such as US companies providing equipment or services to Ukraine. Overtime, however, business and industry must watch their long-term bottom lines. They can’t rely on public relations stunts, as they lose their novelty, and financial benefits. They then begin to face issues of sustainability.

In contrast, more command economies can shift policy to support defense, as Russia has done to bolster its military and defense spending. Over 6 percent of the Russia’s GDP is focused on military and defense, about three times the level of funding provided by Western liberal market economies, many of which are straining to reach 2 percent funding for military and defence support. This means that domestic infrastructures and services might suffer in Russia, as seems to be happening. However, autocracies like Russia can put a lid on domestic unrest, as Putin is doing at present.

Democratic failures are likely to spawn more rapid market failures and vice versa, creating a vicious cycle. But it is even worse, as democracies and markets run on trust. These failures quickly lead to crises of trust, which we see in European responses to the US Congressional impasse on Ukraine funding. And as trust in the US declines, its entire international network of relationships come into a stark reset.

Turning this around to restore trust and sustain policy is exceedingly difficult. Take two problems in particular: fatigue and what I would call an ecology of games.

Fatigue has been a focus of much press coverage over the course of the war in Ukraine. The public becomes exhausted to a protracted conflict or distracted with the next crisis. The energy of public concern dissipates with fatigue, reducing the pressure on politicians to do something. President Volodymyr Zelensky’s charisma and leadership has been an anecdote to fatigue for much of the war, but even his talent struggles with setbacks on the battlefield and the rise of new crises. Too often, the public are fickle.

In addition, support for a war is not simply a holistic rational decision but can be the outcome of an ecology of other games. The most obvious example is the case of US politics, where issues such as efforts to stop illegal immigration have become more important objectives to many of Trump’s ‘MAGA Republicans’ than are the lives of Ukrainians. Their representatives in the US Congress will be focused on appeasing concerns over immigration, for example, even if it means undermining US policy towards Russia and Ukraine. They are playing another game, and one that is increasingly possible if the public is fatigued by the war in Ukraine.

Domestic politics in the US and other countries are beset by complex ecologies of games that can lead otherwise rational people to take irrational positions on the Ukraine-Russia War. You can hear some Americans lamenting that they ‘feel bad about Ukraine but must address the problems with immigration”. Often when it seems like people are acting irrationally, it is because they are playing a different game.

Take Donald Trump, for instance. Many pundits argue that Trump is telling his followers in Congress not to vote for funding to support better border controls (irrational given the wishes of his ‘base’) because that would give President Joe Biden a legislative win and undermine Donald Trump in a more important game, the 2024 Presidential election.

And the international ecology of games underway is fraught as well. One would rationally expect nearly all nations to support the protection of a sovereign nation from an unprovoked invasion. It could happen to them. However, many are more concerned about maintaining financial and trade support with Russia than with supporting a country far, far, away. They may see through Russian propaganda about being the victim, but they ignore the realities because they are playing another trade-finance game, for instance.

All this suggests that it is exceedingly dangerous to let support for Ukraine be undermined by the dynamics of democratic or market incentives and institutions. If more people understood the ways in which democracies and markets can lose the plot, they may make more globally and nationally rational choices. The future of Ukraine is at stake but in the long-term, so is the future of democracies and liberal market economies as trust in their policies decline.  

I’d value your comments, criticisms, or further thoughts.