Jettison the Digital Nanny State: Digitally Augment Users

My last blog argued that the UK should stop moving along the road of a duty of care regime, as this will lead Britain to become what might be called a ‘Digital Nanny State’, undermining the privacy and freedom of expression of all users. A promising number of readers agreed with my concerns, but some asked whether there was an alternative solution.

Before offering my suggestions, I must say that I do not see any solutions outlined by the duty of care regime. Essentially, a ‘duty of care’ approach[1], as outlined in the Cyber Harms White Paper would delegate solutions to the big tech companies, threatening top executives with huge fines or criminal charges if they fail to stop or address them.[2] That said, I assume that any ‘solutions’ would involve major breaches of the privacy and freedom of expression of Internet users across Britain given that surveillance and content controls would be the most likely necessity of their approach. The remedy would be draconian and worse that the problems to be addressed.[3]

Nevertheless, it is fair to ask how the problems raised by the lists of cyber harms could be addressed. Let me outline elements of a more viable approach. 

Move Away from the Concept of Cyber Harms

Under the umbrella of cyber harms are lumped a wide range of problems that have little in common beyond being potential problems for some Internet users. Looked at with any care it is impossible to see them as that similar in origin or solution. For example, disinformation is quite different from sexting. They involve different kinds of problems, to different people, imposed by different actors. Trolling is a fundamentally different set of issues than the promotion of female genital mutilation (FGM). The only common denominator is that any of these actions might result is some harm at some level for some individuals or groups – but they are so different that they violate common sense and logic to put them into the same scheme. 

Moreover, any of the problems are not harms per se, but actions that could be harmful – maybe even lead to many harms at many different levels, from psychological to physical.  Step one in any reasonable approach would be to decompose this list of cyber harms into specific problems in order to think through how each problem could be addressed. Graham Smith captures this problem in noting that the mishmash of cyber harms might be better labelled ‘users behaving badly’.[4] The authors of the White Paper did not want a ‘fragmented’ array of problems, but the reality is that there are distinctly different problems that need to be addressed in different ways in different contexts by different people. For example, others have argued for looking at cyber harms from the perspective of human rights law. But each problem needs to be addressed on its own terms.

Remember that Technologies have Dual Effects

Ithiel de Sola Pool pointed out how almost any negative impact of the telephone could be said to have exactly the opposite impact as well – ‘dual effects’.[5] For example, a telephone in one’s home could undermine your privacy by interrupting the peace and quiet of the household, but it could also provide more privacy compared to people coming to your door. A computer could be used to enhance the efficiency of an organization, but if poorly designed and implemented, the same technology could undermine its efficiency. In short, technologies do not have inherent, deterministic effects, as their implications can be shaped by how we design, use and govern them in particular contexts. 

This is important here because the discussion of cyber harms is occurring is a dystopian climate of opinion. Journalists, politicians, and academics are jumping on a dystopian bandwagon that is as misleading as the utopian bandwagon of the Arab Spring when all thought the Internet would democratize the world. Both the utopian and dystopian perspectives are misleading, deterministic viewpoints that are unhelpful for policy and practice. 

Recognise: Cyber Space is not the Wild West

Many of the cyber harms listed in the White Paper are activities that are illegal. It seems silly to remind the Home Office in the UK that what is illegal in the physical world is also illegal online in so-called cyber space or our virtual world. Given that financial fraud or selling drugs is illegal, then it is illegal online, and is a matter for law enforcement. The difference is that activities online do not always respect the same boundaries as activities in the real world of jurisdictions, law enforcement, and the courts. But this does not make the activities any less illegal, only more jurisdictionally complex to police and enforce. This does not require new law but better approaches to connecting and coordinating law enforcement across geography of spaces and places. Law enforcement agencies can request information from Internet platforms, but they probably should not outsource law enforcement, as suggested by the cyber harms framework. Cyber space is not the “Wild West” and never was.

Legal, but Potentially Harmful, Activities Can be Managed

The White Paper lists many activities that are not necessarily illegal – in fact some actions are not illegal, but potentially harmful. Cyberbullying is one example. Someone bullying another person is potentially harmful, but not necessarily. It is sometimes possible to ignore or standup to a bully and find that this actually could raise one’s self-esteem and sense of efficacy. A bully on the playground can be stopped by a person standing up to him or her, or another person intervening, or a supervisor on the playground calling a stop to it. If an individual repeatedly bullies, or actually harms another person, then they face penalties in the context of that activity, such as the school or workplace. In many ways, the act of cyberbullying can be useful in proving that a particular actor bullied another person. 

Many other examples could be developed to show how each problem has unique aspects and requires different networks of actors to be involved in managing or mitigating any harms. Many problems do not involve malicious actors, but some do. Many occur in households, others in schools, and workplaces, and anywhere at any time. The actors, problems, and contexts matter, and need to be considered in addressing these issues. 

Augment User Intelligence to Move Regulation Closer to Home

Many are beginning to address the hype surrounding artificial intelligence (AI) as a technological fix.[6] But in the spirit of Douglas Englebart in the 1950s, computers and the Internet can be designed to ‘augment’ human intelligence, and AI along with other tools have the potential to augment the choices of Internet users, as so widely experience in the use of search. While technically and socially challenging, it is possible and an innovative challenge to develop approaches to using digital technology to move regulation closer to the users: with content regulation, for example, being enabled by networked individuals, households, schools, businesses, and governmental organizations, as opposed to moving regulation up to big tech companies or governmental regulators. 

Efforts in the 1990s to develop a violence-chip (V-chip) for televisions provides an early example of this approach. It was designed to allow parents to set controls to prevent young children from watching adult programming. It would move content controls closer to the viewers and, theoretically, parents. [Children were often the only members of the household who knew how to use the V-chip.] The idea was good, its implementation limited. 

Cable television services often enable the use of a child lock for reducing access by children to adult programming. Video streaming services and age verification systems have had problems but remain ways to potentially enable a household to create services safer for children. Mobile Internet and video streaming services have apps for kids. Increasingly, it should be possible to design more ways to control access to content by users and households in ways that can address many of the problems raised by the cyber harms framework, such as access to violent content, that can be filtered by users.

With emerging approaches of AI, for example, it could be possible to not simply have warning flags, but information that could be used by users to decide whether to block or filter online content, such as unfriending a social media user. With respect to email, while such tools are in their infancy, there is the potential for AI to be used to identify emails that reflect bullying behavior. So Internet users will be increasingly able to detect individuals or messages that are toxic or malicious before they even see them, much like SPAM and junk mail can disappear before ever being seen by the user.[7] Mobile apps, digital media, intelligent home hubs and routers, and computer software generally could be designed and used to enable users to address their personal and household concerns. 

One drawback might be the ways in which digital divides and skills could enable the most digitally empowered households to have more sophisticated control over content and services. This will create a need for public services to help households without the skills ‘inhouse’ to grapple with emerging technology. However, this could be a major aspect of educational and awareness training that is one valuable recommendation of the Cyber Harms White Paper. Some households might create a personalized and unique set of controls over content, while others might simply choose from a number of set profiles that can be constantly up-dated, much like anti-virus software and SPAM filters that permit users to adjust the severity of filtering. In the future, it may be as easy to avoid unwanted content as it now is to avoid SPAM and junk mail. 

Disinformation provides another example of a problem that can be addressed by existing technologies, like the use of multiple media sources and search technologies. Our own research found that most Internet users consulted four our more sources of information about politics, for example, and online (one source), they would consult an average of four different sources.[8] These patterns of search meant that very few users are likely to be trapped in a filter bubble or echo chamber, albeit still subject to the selective perception bias that no technology can cure. 


My basic argument is to not to panic in this dystopian climate of opinion and consider the following:

  • Jettison the duty of care regime. It will create problems that are disproportionately greater than the problems to be addressed.
  • Jettison the artificial category of cyber harms. It puts apples and oranges in the same basket in very unhelpful ways, mixing legal and illegal activities, and activities that are inherently harmful promotion of FMG, with activities that can be handled by a variety of actors and mitigating actions. 
  • Augment the intelligence of users. Push regulation down to users – enable them to regulate content seen by themselves or for their children. 

If we get rid of this cyber harm umbrella and look at each ‘harm’ as a unique problem, with different actors, contexts, and solutions, then they can each be dealt with through more uniquely appropriate mechanisms. 

That would be my suggestion. Not as simple as asking others to just ‘take care of this’ or ‘stop this’ but there simply is no magic wand or silver bullet that the big tech companies have at their command to accomplish this. Sooner or later, each problem needs to be addressed by often different but appropriate sets of actors, ranging from children, parents, and Internet users to schools, business and governmental organizations, law enforcement, and Internet platforms. The silver lining might be that as the Internet and its benefits become ever more embedded in everyday life and work. And as digital media become more critical that we routinely consider the potential problems as well as the benefits of every innovation made in the design, use, and governance of the Internet in your life and work. All should aim to further empower users to use, and control, and network with others to control the Internet and related digital media, and not to be controlled by a nanny state.  

Further Reading

Useful and broad overviews of the problems with the cyber harms White Paper are available by Gian Volpicelli in Wired[9] and Graham Smith[10] along with many contributions to the Cyber Harms White Paper consultation.


[1] A solicitor, Graham Smith, has argued quite authoritatively that the White Paper actually “abandons the principles underpinning existing duties of care”, see his paper, ‘Online Harms White Paper Consultation – Response to Consultation’, 28 June 2019, posted on his Twitter feed:  https://www.cyberleagle.com/2019/06/speech-is-not-tripping-hazard-response.html

[2] https://www.bmmagazine.co.uk/news/tech-bosses-could-face-criminal-proceedings-if-they-fail-to-protect-users/

[3] Here I found agreement with the views of Paul Barron’s blog, ‘Response to Online Harms White Paper’, 3 July 2019: https://paulbernal.wordpress.com/2019/07/03/response-to-online-harms-white-paper/ Also, see his book, The Internet, Warts and AllCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

[4] https://inforrm.org/2019/04/30/users-behaving-badly-the-online-harms-white-paper-graham-smith/

[5] Ithiel de Sola Pool (1983), Forecasting the Telephone: A Retrospective Technology Assessment. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 

[6] See, for example, Michael Veale, ‘A Critical Take on the Policy Recommendations of the EU High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence’, October 2019, forthcoming in the European Journal of Risk Regulation, available at: https://osf.io/preprints/lawarxiv/dvx4f/

[7] https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jan/03/metoobots-scientists-develop-ai-detect-harassment

[8] See Dutton, W. H. and Fernandez, L., ‘How Susceptible are Internet Users‘, Intermedia, Vol 46 No 4 December/January 2019

[9] https://www.wired.co.uk/article/online-harms-white-paper-uk-analysis

[10] https://inforrm.org/2019/04/30/users-behaving-badly-the-online-harms-white-paper-graham-smith/

Britain's Digital Nanny State

The way in which the UK is approaching the regulation of social media will undermine privacy and freedom of expression and have a chilling effect on Internet use by everyone in Britain. Perhaps it is because discussion of a new approach to Internet regulation occurred in the midst of the public’s focus on Brexit, this initiative has not really been exposed to critical scrutiny. Ironically, its implementation would do incredible harm to the human rights of the public at large albeit in the name of curbing the use of the Internet by malicious users, such as terrorists and pedophiles. Hopefully, it is not too late to reconsider this cyber harms framework. 

The problems with the government’s approach were covered well by Gian Voipicelli in an article in Wired UK. I presented my own concerns in a summary to the consumer forum for communications in June of 2019.[1] The problems with this approach were so apparent that I could not imagine this idea making its way into the Queen’s Speech as part of the legislative programme for the newly elected Conservative Government. It has, so let me briefly outline my concerns. 

Robert Huntington, The Nanny State, book cover

The aim has been to find a way to stop illegal or ‘unacceptable’ content and activity online. The problem has been finding a way to regulate the Internet and social media in ways that could accomplish this aim without violating the privacy and freedom of all digital citizens – networked individuals, such as yourself. The big idea has been to apply a duty of care responsibility on the social media companies, the intermediaries between those who use the Internet. Generally, Internet companies, like telephone companies, in the past, would not be held responsible for what their users do. Their liability would be very limited. Imagine a phone company sued because a pedophile used the phone. The phone company would have to surveil all telephone use to catch offenses. Likewise, Internet intermediaries will need to know what everyone is using the Internet and social media for to stop illegal or ‘unacceptable’ behavior. This is one reason why many commentators have referred to this as a draconian initiative. 

So, what are the possible harms? Before enumerating the harms it does consider, it does not deal with harms covered by other legislation or regulators, such as privacy, which is the responsibility of the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). Ironically, one of the major harms of this initiative will be to the privacy of individual Internet users. Where is the ICO?

The harms cited as within the scope of this cyber harms initiative included: child sexual exploitation and abuse; terrorist content and activity; organized immigration crime; modern slavery; extreme pornography; harassment and cyberstalking;  hate crime; encouraging and assisting suicide; incitement to violence; sale of illegal goods/services, such as drugs and weapons (on the open Internet); content illegally uploaded from prisons; sexting of indecent images by under 18s (creating, possessing, copying or distributing indecent or sexual images of children and young people under the age of 18). This is only a start, as there are cyber harms with ‘less clear’ definitions, including: cyberbullying and trolling; extremist content and activity; coercive behaviour; intimidation; disinformation; violent content; advocacy of self-harm; promotion of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM); and underage exposure to legal content, such as children accessing pornography, and spending excessive time online – screen time.  Clearly, this is a huge range of possible harms, and the list can be expanded over time, as new harms are discovered. 

Take one harm, for example, disinformation. Seriously, do you want the regulator, or the social media companies to judge what is disinformation? This would be ludicrous. Internet companies are not public service broadcasters, even though many would like them to behave as if they were. 

The idea is that those companies that allow users to share or discover ‘user-generated content or interact with each other online’ will have ‘a statutory duty of care’ to be responsible for the safety of their users and prevent them from suffering these harms. If they fail, the regulator can take action against the companies, such as fining the social media executives, or threatening them with criminal prosecution.[2]

The White Paper also recommended several technical initiatives, such as to flag suspicious content, and educational initiatives, such as in online media literacy. But the duty of care responsibility is the key and most problematic issue. 

Specifically, the cyber harms initiative poses the following risks: 

  1. Covering an overly broad and open-ended range of cyber harms;
  2. Requiring surveillance in order to police this duty that could undermine privacy of all users;
  3. Incentivizing companies to over-regulate content & activity, resulting in more restrictions on anonymity, speech, and chilling effects on freedom of expression;
  4. Generating more fear, and panic among the general public, undermining adoption & use of the Internet and widening digital divides;
  5. Necessitating an invasive monitoring of content, facing a volume of instances that is an order of magnitude beyond traditional media and telecom, such as 300 hours of video posted on YouTube every minute;
  6. Essentially targeting American tech giants (no British companies), and even suggesting subsidies for British companies, which will be viewed as protectionist, leaving Britain as a virtual backwater of a more global Internet; 
  7. Increasing the fragmentation of Internet regulators: a new regulator, Ofcom, new consumer ‘champion’, ICO, or more?

Notwithstanding these risks, this push is finding support for a variety of reasons. One general driver has been the rise of a dystopian climate of opinion about the Internet and social media over the last decade. This has been exacerbated by concerns over child protection and elections in the US, across Europe, such as with Cambridge Analytica, and with Brexit that created the spectre of foreign interference. Also, Europe and the UK have not developed Internet and social media companies comparable to the so-called big nine of the US and China. (While the UK has a strong online game industry, this industry is not mentioned at all in the White Paper, except as a target of subsidies.) The Internet and social media companies are viewed as foreign, and primarily American, companies that are politically popular to target. In this context, the platformization of the Internet and social media has been a gift to regulators — the potential for companies to police a large proportion of traffic, providing a way forward for politicians and regulators to ‘do something’. But at what costs? 

The public has valid complaints and concerns over instances of online harms. Politicians have not known what to do, but now have been led to believe they can simply turn to the companies and command them to stop cyber harms from occurring, or they will suffer the consequences in the way of executives facing steep fines or criminal penalties. But this carries huge risks, primarily in leading to over-regulation and inappropriate curtailing of the privacy and freedom of expression of all digital citizens across the UK. 

You only need to look at China to see how this model works. In China, an Internet or social media company could lose its license overnight if it allowed users to cross red lines determined by the government. And this fear has unsurprisingly led to over-regulation by these companies. Thus, the central government of China can count on private firms to strictly regulate Internet content and use. A similar outcome will occur in Britain, making it not the safest place to be online, but a place you would not want to be online with your content with even screen time under surveillance. User-generated content will be dangerous. Broadcast news and entertainment will be safe. Let the public watch movies. 

In conclusion, while I am an American, I don’t think this is simply an American obsession with freedom of expression. This right is not absolute even in the USA. Internet users across the world value their ability to ask questions, voice concerns, and use online digital media to access information, people, and services they like without fear of surveillance.[3] It can be a technology of freedom, as Ithiel de Sola Pool argued, in countries that support freedom of expression and personal privacy. If Britons decide to ask the government and regulators to restrict their use of the Internet and social media – for their own good – then they should support this framework for an e-nanny, or digital-nanny state. But its implications for Britain are real cyber harms that will result from this duty of care framework. 


[1] A link to my slides for this presentation is here: https://www.slideshare.net/WHDutton/online-harms-white-paper-april-2019-bill-dutton?qid=5ea724d0-7b80-4e27-bfe0-545bdbd13b93&v=&b=&from_search=1

[2] https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/tech-bosses-face-court-if-they-fail-to-protect-users-q6sp0wzt7

[3] Dutton, W. H., Law, G., Bolsover, G., and Dutta, S. (2013, released 2014) The Internet Trust Bubble: Global Values, Beliefs and Practices. NY: World Economic Forum. 

Fake News Nation – a new book by Aspray and Cortada is out!

I’d like to recommend to you a new book, entitled Fake News Nation: The Long History of Lies and Misinterpretations in America (Rowman & Littlefield, 2019). Information about the book is at: https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538131107/Fake-News-Nation-The-Long-History-of-Lies-and-Misinterpretations-in-America

As I noted in my endorsement of this book: “James W. Cortada and Willam Aspray’s brilliantly selected and crafted case studies are must-reads because they bring historical insight to issues of fake news, disinformation, and conspiracy theories of our digital age.”

 

Cultural and Social Dimensions of Cybersecurity

I have been working over the past years with Oxford’s Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre (GCSCC), which is associated with the Oxford Martin School and Department of Computer Science at Oxford, as well as several other departments, including the OII, and Saïd Business School. My own work has been focused on bringing the social sciences into the discussion, primarily by directing work on the cultural and social dimensions of cybersecurity.

Bill courtesy of Voices from Oxford (VOX)

I happened across a video we produced years ago in which I sought to address some of the questions in this area of cybersecurity. It is available here: https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/cyber-security/responsible-cyber-culture/

There are also a few articles I’ve written, often with others, on aspects of these social and cultural dimensions, including:

Creese, S., Shillair, R., Bada, M., Reisdorf, B.C., Roberts, T., and Dutton, W. H. (2019), ‘The Cybersecurity Capacity of Nations’, pp. 165-179 in Graham, M., and Dutton, W. H. (eds), Society and the Internet: How Networks of Information and Communication are Changing our Lives, 2ndEdition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. An earlier version of this book chapter was presented at the TPRC conference and available online at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2938078

Dutton, W. H., and GCSCC (2018), ‘Collaborative Approaches to a Wicked Problem: Global Responses to Cybersecurity Capacity Building’, February. Notes on the 2018 Annual GCSCC Conference, Oxford University: Available online at: https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity-capacity/system/files/GCSCC%20Annual%20Conference%202018%20Output%20180508%20.pdf

Dutton, W. (2017), ‘Fostering a Cyber Security Mindset’, Internet Policy Review, 6(1): DOI: 10.14763/2017.1.443 Available at: https://policyreview.info/node/443/pdf. An abridged version was reprinted in Encore, a publication of The Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society (HIIG), forthcoming in 2018. https://www.hiig.de/en/fostering-cybersecurity-mindset/

Bauer, J., and Dutton, W. H. (2015), “The New Cybersecurity Agenda: Economic and Social Challenges to a Secure Internet’, Joint Working Paper for the Global Cyber Security Centre at the University of Oxford, and the Quello Center, Michigan State University. Available online at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2614545

Dutta, S., Dutton, W. H. and Law, G. (2011), The New InternetWorld: A Global Perspective on Freedom of Expression, Privacy, Trust and Security Online: The Global Information Technology Report 2010-2011. New York: World Economic Forum, April. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1810005

Society and the Internet, 2nd Edition

It is such a pleasure to see the publication today of the second edition of Society and the Internet by Oxford University Press. My co-editor, Mark Graham, and I worked long and hard to assemble a wonderful set of authors to build on the first edition. The success of the original volume led to this new edition. The pace and scale of changes in the issues surrounding the Internet led to almost a completely new set of chapters. Information about the 2nd edition is available on the OUP web site for the paperback edition here, and the hardback here.

Society and the Internet, 2nd Edition

Our thanks to OUP and the many professional staff who helped us produce this new 2nd edition, and particularly to my friend Steve Russell for the brilliant art work on the cover. Thanks as well to the OII, which inspired our lecture series that led to these volumes, and OII colleagues who launched much of the research that informs them. I hope you can read the acknowledgements in full as we owe thanks to so many individuals and institutions, such as MSU’s Quello Center, which together with the Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre, supported my own contributions to this second edition.

We owe incredible thanks to our colleague Manuel Castells for his insightful foreword and all the authors of the book’s 24 chapters. These colleagues endured our many requests and most importantly accepted our call to contribute to what we hope will be a perfect reader for courses on Internet studies, digital technology and society, new media, and many other courses dealing with society and the Internet. The authors include junior and senior researchers from around the world. To all, we send our appreciation. No more deadlines, we promise. The authors are:

Maria Bada, Cambridge Cybercrime Centre
Grant Blank, University of Oxford
Samantha Bradshaw, University of Oxford
David A. Bray, People-Centered Internet
Antonio A. Casilli, Paris Institute of Technology
Manuel Castells, University of Southern California
Vint Cerf, Google
Sadie Creese, University of Oxford
Matthew David, Durham University
Laura DeNardis, American University, Washington, DC
Martin Dittus, University of Oxford
Elizabeth Dubois, University of Ottawa
Sandra González-Bailón, University of Pennsylvania 
Scott A. Hale, University of Oxford
Eszter Hargittai, University of Zurich
Philip N. Howard, University of Oxford
Peter John, King’s College London 
Sílvia Majó-Vázquez, University of Oxford
Helen Margetts, University of Oxford
Marina Micheli, European Commission
Christopher Millard, Queen Mary University of London
Lisa Nakamura, University of Michigan
Victoria Nash, University of Oxford
Gina Neff, University of Oxford
Eli Noam, Columbia Business School 
Sanna Ojanperä, University of Oxford
Julian Posada, University of Toronto
Anabel Quan-Haase, University of Western Ontario
Jack Linchuan Qiu, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Lee Rainie, Pew Research Center
Bianca C. Reisdorf, University of North Carolina at Charlotte
Ralph Schroeder, University of Oxford
Limor Shifman, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Ruth Shillair, Michigan State University 
Greg Taylor, University of Oxford
Hua Wang, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York
Barry Wellman, NetLab
Renwen Zhang, Northwestern University

So, if you are seriously interested in the societal implications of the Internet and related social media and the mobile Internet, please consider this reader. You will see a variety of methods, data, and theoretical perspectives in play to address important issues in ways that challenge conventional wisdom and punditry about the Internet. You can get a paperback edition from OUP here or from your favourite bookstore.

Nominate an Early Career Research to Become a TPRC Junior Fellow

The TPRC is seeking to select up to 6 TPRC Junior Fellows – early-career researchers engaged in research on the Internet, telecommunication and media policy in the digital age. Please nominate individuals whom you think might make outstanding fellows. Those who have wond student paper awards at the TPRC conference as well as those who served Benton Award winners could be candidates, but we are open to anyone you feel to have the potential to do outstanding research on key issues for the TPRC, and engage other early-career researchers in our activities.

The TPRC Junior Fellows Program was designed in part to award excellence but also tobring new members into the TPRC community. Those appointed will be honoured and serve as ambassadors for TPRC, working pro bono and appointed to two-year terms by the Board. Junior Fellows will be emerging scholars with good connections to their peers, including but not limited to successful TPRC paper presenters and alumni of the Graduate Student Consortium and Benton Award.

TPRC hopes that Junior Fellows will help broaden the TPRC community, and improve the participation of underrepresented groups, such as young academics, certain disciplines not traditionally involved in telecom research who are engaged in new media and digitial policy, and those engaged in new research areas, as well as those who bring greater diversity to our community, including women, minorities, and under-represented groups.

The TPRC Board anticipates that Fellows will disseminate information about TPRC on their personal networks, and identify and engage 1-1 with prospective attendees and encourage them to participate in TPRC. In return, TPRC will recognize Fellows on the TPRC web site, and publicly welcome new appointees during the conference, and provide material and mentoring to support their outreach mission. Of course, the Early Career Fellows will be able to list this service on their resumes. Each Fellow will have a designated Board liaison, who will check in periodically to discuss support needed and progress made. TPRC will aim to support your career.

Desiderata

We’re looking for people that meet as many of the following criteria as possible. None of them are required qualifications; we don’t expect that anyone will check all the boxes.

  • From under-represented groups, including women and minorities
  • Working in new research areas and those under-represented at TPRC
  • Academic talent and promise
  • Good network of contacts, e.g. active on social media
  • Able and willing to advocate for TPRC

For information about the TPRC, see: http://www.tprcweb.com/

If you have ideas, you may contact me on this site, or by email at william.dutton@gmail.com

Cybersecurity and the Rationale for Capacity Building: Notes on a Conference

The fifth annual conference of Oxford’s Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre (GCSCC) was held in late February 2019 at the Oxford University’s Martin School. It engaged over 120 individuals from the capacity building community in one full day of conference sessions, preceded and followed by several days of more specialized meetings.*

The focus of the conference was on taking stock of the last five years of the Centre’s work, and looking ahead to the next five years in what is an incredibly fast moving area of Internet studies. So it was an ideal setting for reflecting on current themes within the cybersecurity and capacity building community. The presentations and discussions at this meeting provided a basis for reflections on major themes of contemporary discussions of cybersecurity and how they come together in ways that reinforce the need for capacity building in this area.

The major themes I took away from the day concerned 1) changing nature of threats and technologies; 2) the large and heterogeneous ecology of actors involved in cybersecurity capacity building; 3) the prominence of cross-national and regional differences; and 4) the range and prevalence of communication issues. These themes gave rise to a general sense of what could be done. Essentially, there was agreement that there was no technical fix to security, and that fear campaigns were ineffective, particularly unless Internet users are provided instructions on how to respond. However, there was also a clear recommendation not to throw up your hands in despair, as ‘cybersecurity capacity building works’ – nations need to see capacity building as a direction for their own strategies and actions.

Bill courtesy of Voices from Oxford (VOX)

I’ll try to further develop each of these points, although I cannot hope to give justice to the discussion throughout the day. Voices from Oxford (VOX) has helped capture the day in a short clip that I will soon post. But here, briefly, are my major takeaways from the day.

Changing Threats and Technologies

The threats to cybersecurity are extremely wide ranging across contexts and technologies, and the technologies are constantly and rapidly changing. Contrast the potential threats to national infrastructures from cyberwarfare with the threats to privacy from the Internet of Things, such as a baby with a toy that is online. The number of permutations of contexts and technologies is great.

The Complex Ecology of Actors

There is a huge and diverse set of actors and institutions involved in cybersecurity capacity building. There are: cybersecurity professionals, IT professionals, IT, software, and Internet industries; non-governmental organizations; donors; researchers; managers of governments and organizations; national and regional agencies; and global bodies, such as the World Economic Forum and the Internet Governance Forum. Each has many separate but overlapping roles and areas of focus, and each has a stake in global cybersecurity given the risks posed by malicious actors that can take advantage of global weaknesses.

One theme of our national cybersecurity reviews was that the multitude of actors within one country that were involved with cybersecurity often came together in one room for the very first time to speak with our research team. Cybersecurity simply involves a diverse range of actors at all levels of nations and organizations, and with a diverse array of relationships to the Internet and information and communication technologies, from professional IT teams and cybersecurity response teams to users. Developing a more coherent perspective on this ecology of actors is a key need in this area.

National and Regional Differences

Another clear theme of the day was the differences across the various nations and regions, including the obvious issues of the smaller versus larger nations in the scale of their efforts, but also between the low and high income nations. We heard cases of Somalia juxtaposed with examples from the UK and Iceland. And the range and nature of actors across these nations often differed dramatically, such as in the relevance of different global facilitating organisations, such as the World Bank.

Communication in So Many Words

Given this ecology of actors in a global arena, it might not be surprising that communication emerged as a dominant theme. It arose through many presentations and discussions of the need for awareness, coordination, collaboration (across areas and levels within nations, across countries, regions), as well as the need for prioritizing efforts and instruction and training, both of which work through communication. Of course, the conference itself was an opportunity for communication and networking that seemed to be highly valued.

What Can Be Done? Capacity Building

However, despite these technical, individual, and national differences, requiring intensive efforts to communicate, coordinate, and collaborate nationally, regionally, and globally, there were some common thoughts on what needs to be done. Time and again, speakers stressed the lack of any technical fix – or what one participant referred to as a silver bullet – to fix cybersecurity. And there was a general consensus that awareness campaigns that were basically fear campaigns did not work. Internet users, whether in households or major organizations, need instructions on what to do in order to improve their security. But doing nothing was not an option, and given the conference, it may not be surprising, but there did seem to be a general acceptance that cybersecurity capacity building was a set of instructions on a way forward. Our own research has provided empirical evidence than capacity building works, and is in the interest of every nation.**

A short video of the conference will give you a more personal sense of the international ecology of stakeholders and issues: https://vimeo.com/voicesfromoxford/review/322632731/ec0d5e5f9f 

Notes

*An overview of the first five years of the centre is available here: https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity-capacity/system/files/GCSCC%20booklet%20WEB.pdf 

**An early working paper is available online at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2938078

 

 

 

Pick up the phone!

Ofcom reports that fewer people are using their mobile phones for making phone calls (Williams 2018). The use of smartphones for calls is declining while their use for texting, emailing, searching and using social media is rising. Clearly, this trend is not unique to the UK, nor is it simply limited to the use if smartphones. But I fear this interesting trend masks a more fundamental shift in communication: Put simply, more people are choosing not to speak with others – by phone or in person.

To illustrate, here is a typical conversation I would have with a former office assistant (OA) in my former university. She was a valued member of our team and went off for an exciting move when her husband was offered a better job. But here was a typical scenario:

Me: Has the approval for our research travel come through?

OA: No. I sent an email two days ago. No word yet.

Me: Could you check, and try to nudge them? We need to move ahead.

OA: OK. I’ll send another email.

Me: Maybe it would be easier if you just picked up the phone? Actually, the office is close – maybe you could pop in a speak to the grant officer.

OA: Its easier to email, and she’ll see it.

Me: OK.

I stew for a moment and then walk the few minutes to the grant office, speak with the officer, and get the approval. All the time I am wondering why no one wants to simply pick up the phone or walk down the hall. Perhaps (undoubtedly) it is more efficient for the OA to email, but not for me waiting for approval. Perhaps the OA doesn’t want to disturb or interrupt the grant officer, but my work is effectively stalled. Am I simply being selfish or is my OA simply following a rational path that is not only the easy way but the contemporary way to do things?  Unknown

Of course, this is a simple anecdote, but it happens so often that I cannot help but wonder how pervasive this style of communication is becoming. When I have shared this view with administrators, they acknowledge this as a growing pattern. And it is not just email, but also so-called enterprise platforms for conducting all sorts of financial, administrative, and personnel matters. Ask about health benefits, and I’m told to check or enroll on our enterprise business system. Of course, these systems are designed to permit fewer administrators to handle more personnel. But ironically, it might also lead to inefficiencies and ineffectiveness, such as sending an email rather than picking up a phone or speaking with the right person.

Maybe I am wrong. Video and voice over IP enables applications like Skype, Google Hangouts, and FaceTime that are permitting more interpersonal conversations to occur among people distributed around the world. And since the 1970s, when people expected electronic telecommunications to enable tradeoffs with travel, research has found that telecommunications tends to reinforce travel as we telecommunicate with those we meet with face-to-face before and after meetings. If we email someone, we are more likely to meet them face-to-face, and vice versa.

But I wonder if we have reached some tipping point where this might well be changing – a point when it is getting increasingly difficult to speak with anyone face-to-face or even on the phone.

Reference

Zoe Williams, ‘It’s so funny how we don’t talk any more’, The Guardian, Friday, 3 August 2018: 5.

 

 

Russian Hacking and the Certainty Trough

Views on Russian Hacking: In a Certainty Trough?

I have been amazed by the level of consensus, among politicians, the press and the directors of security agencies, over the origins and motivations behind the Russian hacking of the 2016 presidential election. Seldom are security agencies willing to confirm or deny security allegations, much less promote them*, even when cyber security experts vary in their certainty over the exact details. Of course there are many interpretations of what we are seeing, including speaking arguments that this is simply a responsible press, partisan politics, reactions to the President-elect, or a clear demonstration of what has been called, in a study of a thread of Israeli journalism, ‘patriotic’ journalism.* For example, you can hear journalists and politicians not only demonizing WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, the messenger, but also arguing that those who do not accept the consensus are virtually enemies of the state.

One useful theoretical perspective that might help make sense of this unfolding display of consensus is the concept of the ‘certainty trough’, anchored in Donald MacKensie’s research** on missile systems and those who had different levels of certainty about their performance, such as their accuracy in hitting the targets they are designed to strike. He was trying to explain how the generals, for example, could be so certain of their performance, when those most directly involved in developing the missile systems were less certain of how well they will perform. screen-shot-2017-01-07-at-15-21-25

The figure applies MacKenzie’s framework to the hacking case. My contention is that you can see aspects of the certainty trough with respect to accounts of Russian hacking of John Podesta’s emails, which led to damaging revelations about the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Clinton Foundation during the election, such as in leading to the resignation of Representative Debbie Wasserman Schultz’s DNC post. On the one hand, there are security experts, most directly involved in, and knowledgeable about, these issues, with less certainty than the politicians and journalists about how sophisticated these hacks of an email account were, and whether they can attribute clear intentions to an ecology of multiple actors. At the other extreme, the public is the least knowledgeable about cyber security, and likely to have less certainty over what happened (see Figure). Put simply, it is not the case that the more you know the more certain you are about the facts of the case.

The upshot of this possibility is that the journalists and politicians involved in this issue should not demonize those who are less certain about who did what to whom in this case. The critics of the skeptics might well be sitting in the certainty trough.

References

*ICA (2017), ‘Intellligence Community Assessment, Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections’, Intelligence Community Assessment, 01D, 6 January: https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf

**Avashalom Ginosar, ‘Understanding Patriotic Journalism: Culture, Ideology and Professional Behavior’, see: https://www.academia.edu/20610610/Understanding_Patriotic_Journalism_Culture_Ideology_and_Professional_Behavior

***for Donald MacKensie’s work on the certainty trough, see: http://modeldiscussion.blogspot.com/2007/01/mackenzies-certainty-trough-nuclear.html or his summary of this work in Dutton, W. H. (1999), Society on the Line. (Oxford: OUP), pages 43-46.

Books and the Internet in Prisons: Beyond the Right to Read

A British High Court justice has ‘struck down a ban on sending books to prisoners’, as reported by the NYT: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/06/world/europe/british-judge-lifts-restriction-on-books-in-prison.html A number of writers, poets and human rights advocates have been pressing for the right of prisoners to buy books from the ‘outside world’. Apparently the prison service had supported access to books, but only through the prison libraries or purchases through the prison service, as a security measure: to prevent the smuggling of other things into the prison, as we have all seen in popular films and television series. It seems to me that it is arguably worth the time and effort of searching packages sent to prisoners in order to enhance access to books. Surely the value of books in educating and supporting the rehabilitation of those in prison is a long-term payoff that offsets the cost of screening.

About a decade ago, I was introduced to an imaginative plan to enable limited access to the Internet from prison. There are a number of programs that enable limited access to electronic text messaging, for example, but by and large, this is a huge hurdle. Nevertheless, I hope advocates of this development are continuing to pursue schemes that might enable safe access to the Internet, such as for access to education and entertainment that could be as important as the right to read. I would like to hear of initiatives in this area, and wish them well.

chinese-internet-jail

Courtesy: http://marktanner.com/blog/the-internet-in-china-going-the-full-circle/